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RELIEF SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
The plaintiff-respondent, Henry Maas, contests the
defendant-appellant, Utah Bank & Trust's

petition for rehearing.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The essential thrust of the defendant-appellant's petition
for rehearing is that no commercially unreasonable disposition of
the subject truck occurred because the defendant-appellant Bank
merely afforded Kenneth Allred the right to redeem the collateral.
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Appellant's Petition for Rehearing p.5.

The appellant-Bank

claims the collateral was redeemed by Kenneth Allred even
though his father, Arvel Allred, paid the balance owing on
the note relevant to this lawsuit.

Id.

Plaintiff-respondent strongly disputes that Kenneth
Allred ever redeemed the collateral.

Kenneth Allred specifi-

cally denied that he asked his father to pay off the outstanding
balance (Tr. 127).

He further denied that Arvel Allred's

making the payoff was in his behalf (Tr. 132).

Arvel Allred

said he paid the Bank the $4,338.00 payoff "To protect this
investment I had.
for this."

What

~ ~

owed

~

and to get some collateral

(Tr. 192 emphasis added).
Any residual question as to Arvel Allred's purpose

in making the payoff payment is dispelled by the following
colloquy from the transcript:
Question [Mr. Felt] :You did pay this money to the
bank to protect your investment in this truck; is this true.
Answer [Arvel Allred] :That is true.

(Tr. 193

emphasis added) .
Respondent believes the foregoing testimony refutes
the argument of the bank that Kenneth Allred redeemed the
truck relevant to the lawsuit.
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I

ARGUMENT
POINT I
I.

THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THIS COURT AND THE

TRIAL JURY CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE DEFENDANT-BANK DISPOSED
OF THE 1972 MACK TRUCK IN A COMMERCIALLY UNREASONABLE MANNER:
A.

COMPETENT, SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE INTRODUCED
AT TRIAL SUPPORTED THAT FINDING

B.

APPELLANT OWED A LEGAL OBLIGATION TO
PLAINTIFF TO DISPOSE OF THE COLLATERAL
IN A COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE MANNER.

A.

Competent, Sufficient Evidence Introduced at

Trial Supported A Finding That The Defendant-Appellant Disposed
Of The 1972 Mack Truck In A Commercially Unreasonable Manner.
Evidence introduced at trial indicated that in
November, 1972 the defendant Kenneth Allred and plaintiffrespondent entered into a lease with option to purchase the
1972 Mack Truck (Tr. 4, 7, Ex. 1-P).

In a supplemental

agreement of August, 1974 those parties agreed that if respondent
paid a reduced sum of money from the original agreement, Maas
would receive title to the truck.

During the time plaintiff-

respondent had possession of the truck he made twenty-six
payments on the truck directly to the defendant-appellant all
of which were accepted (Tr. 10, 73, 82, 87, 91-92, 97).

Mr.

Maas told the Bank he had bought the truck from Allred.
Respondent claims a Mr. Picket of the appellant-Bank accepted
that fact (Tr. 15).

Mr. Maas talked to Mr. Kotter of the Bank

about title to the 1972 Mack and another vehicle (Tr. 16).

I
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Plaintiff's wife normally made the payments to the
Bank by enclosing the actual payment together with a payment
coupon printed on the Bank's own form (Tr. 197).

Plaintiff

obtained the coupon book from Kenneth Allred (Tr. 80-81).
At a minimum the Bank knew Mr. Maas had "operating rights"
in the truck (Tr. 87, 267).
After the appellant-Bank accepted the payoff from
Arvel Allred, plaintiff testified Mr. Kotter told him "the
truck had been sold."

(Tr. 49).

From the earlier quoted

testimony of Kenneth Allred it is clearly his position that
Arvel Allred' s payoff payment was not made at Kenneth's request
or for his benefit (Tr. 127, 132).

And Arvel said he made

the payment to protect his own investment (Tr. 192, 193).
The appellant-Bank, notwithstanding its knowledge
that Maas was making payments on the truck, and notwithstanding
its admitted awareness that Maas had operating rights to the
truck, failed to give plaintiff notice of sale or disposition
or opportunity to object (Tr. 50).

It disposed of that truck

for a sum less than one quarter of what the trial jury found
the fair market value of the truck was (Tr. 190-191, R-320
Answer to Proposition No. 8).
Respondent respectfully contends that the above
recited facts constitute evidence upon which a trier of fact
could reasonably conclude that the defendant-appellant's
disposition of the 1972 Mack truck was commercially unreasonable.

The finding of the trial jury and the holding of the

majority of this court are both amply supported by the evidence
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and should be sustained without reargument.
B.

Appellant Had A Legal Obligation to Plaintiff

To Dispose Of The Collateral In A Commercially Reasonable
~·

Article Nine of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code,
both as it reads now and as it read at the time of the Bank's
disposition of the 1972 Mack truck, clearly provides and
provided that even a secured party can only dispose of collateral if there has been a default.
70A-9-504(1)
amended.

Utah Code Annotated

(1977 Supp.), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as

The trial jury specifically found that the appellant

Bank waived the three payments due on the

promiss~ry

note

until the end of the business hours of the Bank on February
28, 1975 (R-320; Proposition No. 7).

It follows that if

plaintiff was not in default, any disposition of the truck
by the Bank would be wrongful, and, by definition, commercially unreasonable.
By habitually accepting payments from Maas the
appellant Bank chose to substitute plaintiff for Kenneth
Allred as the contract debtor.

Section 9-504(3) of the Utah

Uniform Commercial Code in its present form and in the form
it existed at the time the Bank disposed of the truck required
a secured party to give reasonable notice of public or private
sale to the "debtor."

And the version of 9-504(3) in effect

in 1975 required that notice (except for consumer goods) also
be given to "any other person who has a security agreement in
the collateral and who has duly filed a financing statement
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indexed in the name of the debtor or who is known by the securec
party to have a security interest in the collateral."
Section 70A-9-105

(of the Utah Uniform Commercial

Code defines "debtor" broadly.

That version of the Code in

effect in 1975 provided:
'Debtor' means the person who owes payment or
other performance of the obligation secured,
whether or not he owns or has rights in the
collateral, and includes the seller of accounts,
contract rights or chattel paper. Where
the debtor and the owner of the collateral
are not the same person, the term 'debtor'
means the owner of the collateral in any
provision of the chapter dealing with the
obli ation, and ma include both where the
context so requires;
emphasis added
See also Section 70-9-lOS(d)

(1977 Supp.), Utah

Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
Respondent respectfully urges that because the Bank
habitually accepted payments from Mr. Maas, looked to him for
payments, recognized his "operating rights" in the truck and
generally acquiesced in his performance of the agreements
which gave him use of that truck, it regarded Maas as, and
Mr. Maas in fact was, a "debtor" within the meaning of the
Utah Uniform Commercial Code.

Mr. Maas was entitled to notice

of and opportunity to bid in at the Bank's disposition of
the 1972 Mack truck.
Respondent further believes appellant's reliance
on Section 70A-9-504, regarding a debtor's right to redeem,
is misplaced.

Indeed, that Section enforces this courts

and trial jury's findings that a commercially unreasonable
disposition occurred since plaintiff-respondent, as a debtor,
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I

I

was entitled to a right to redeem which the Bank never gave
him.

Not only was the disposition or sale price of the

1972 Mack grossly inadequate, but there was also an utter
failure of respondent to give notice and opportunity to
bid to plaintiff who was entitled to both.

CONCLUSION
The majority opinion of this court and the trial
jury correctly determined that the appellant-Bank's disposition of the 1972 Mack truck was commercially unreasonable.
Appellant's petition for rehearing should be denied.
Respondent prays for his costs for filing his

brie~

Further
in answer

to petition for rehearing.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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